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Abstract
Flow monitoring has been used for accounting and security for more than two decades. This paper
describes how it was developed, what is its current status, and what challenges can be expected in this
field in the following years.
1.1 The Past
The first mention of a flow export can be found in RFC 1272 [1] published in 1991 by IETF Internet Ac-
counting (IA) Working Group (WG). The goal of the document was to provide background information
on Internet accounting. The authors describe methods of metering and reporting network utilisation. The
goal at the time was to provide a framework for traffic accounting. However, the common belief was that
the internet should be free and any form of traffic capture, even for accounting purposes, is undesirable.
This, together with the lack of vendor interest, resulted in the conclusion of the working group in 1993.
Note that the negative attitude towards the monitoring returns more than 20 years later [2].
In 1995, Claffy, Braun, and Polyzos showed a methodology for internet traffic flow profiling based
on packet aggregation [3], which started a revival of flow monitoring efforts. The Realtime Traffic Flow
Measurement (RTFM) Working Group was active since 1996 and was concluded in 2000 by publishing
several RFCs describing new traffic flow measurement framework with increased flexibility and even
provided bi-directional flow support [4]. Since these documents fulfilled the objectives of the RTFM
WG, the group was concluded in 2000. However, no flow export standard was developed as the vendors
showed no interest in this area.
Meanwhile, Cisco realised that similar kind of flow information is already stored in a flow cache of
their packet switching devices. The purpose of this cache is to speed up packet switching by making a
forwarding decision only for the first packet of each flow. Unlike the RTFM flow measurement frame-
work, the primary purpose of flow cache is not accounting nor monitoring. Therefore the configuration
of the measurement process using a flow cache in a switch is severely limited. Despite the limitations,
once Cisco introduced its flow export technology called NetFlow, it achieved widespread adoption. The
main reason for the wide adoption was the fact that it was readily available on most Cisco devices with
little effort. The NetFlow was patented in 1996, and the first version that became available to the gen-
eral public around 2002 was NetFlow v5 [5], albeit Cisco newer released any official specification. The
NetFlow v5 format simply specified a single set of fields that should be exported from each flow record.
NetFlow v5 was soon obsoleted by NetFlow v9 which remedied some of the deficiencies of the
previous version. The state of NetFlow v9 is described in [6]. It allowed defining an arbitrary set of
fields for export using templates. It also introduced support for new protocols, such as IPv6, Virtual Local
Area Networks (VLAN), Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) or
Multicast.
Other vendors created their own versions of flow exporting protocols, although they retained some
level of compatibility with NetFlow. There are JFlow by Juniper, CFlow by Alcatel-Lucent, RFlow
by Ericsson, and other protocols. When the potential of flow monitoring for security purposes became
realised in 2005 [7], more effort was devoted to extending flow records with information not directly
associated with switching. Cisco presented Flexible NetFlow technology [8] in 2006, which allows to
dynamically define and export new types of information, such as parts of payloads or traffic identification.
In 2001, it was clear that exporting flow information from switching devices was going to be sup-
ported by vendors. However, no standard flow export protocol existed at the time, and NetFlow v5 was
not yet released to the general public. For that reason, the IETF started IP Flow Information Export
(IPFIX) WG [9]. The charter was updated over the years to match current requirements. Several vendors
were engaged in the IPFIX WG’s activities, most notably Cisco, which significantly contributed from
the start. The WG defined a set of requirements for the IPFIX protocol [10] and evaluated existing can-
didate protocols [11] to decide the most suitable approach to defining the new protocol. The NetFlow v9
specification (RFC 3954) was designed with IPFIX requirements in mind [12] and was released in order
to compete in this evaluation (RFC 3955). After the evaluation, the NetFlow v9 was chosen as a basis of
the new IPFIX protocol. For this reason, IPFIX is sometimes called NetFlow v10 and even starts with
protocol version 10 in its header. However, the IPFIX protocol supports many new features and is not
completely backwards compatible with NetFlow.
The IPFIX WG did more than just design the IPFIX protocol. In the 29 RFCs published before
its conclusion, the WG paid attention to, for example bidirectional flow export, architecture for IP flow
information export, reducing redundancy in flow and IP flow mediation framework. The IPFIX protocol
specification is described by “Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for
the Exchange of Flow Information” [13] which became an Internet Standard. The working group was
concluded in 2014; however, IPFIX related Internet-Drafts are still being created by involved parties.
Further information about IPFIX development is provided by Brownlee in [14].
The importance of flow monitoring for security purposes was recognized by Cisco engineers in 2005
who proposed to use NetFlow for anomaly detection and traffic analysis [7]. Creation of dedicated flow
monitoring probes allowed to easily extend the set of collected flow features and add the application
information to the flows. Pioneers in this area were Cisco, ntop, Masaryk University, and CESNET.
Applications such as HTTP, DNS, and SMTP were being analysed. Cisco published a tool called joy [15]
in 2016 which allows collecting a rich set of information about network connections.
1.2 The Now
Concern for the privacy of users has been rising in recent years, which led to extensive deployment of
encryption of network traffic. It is more and more difficult to monitor network applications as most traffic
is protected by TLS of other encryption protocols. HTTP/2 is supported only together with encryption by
mainstream browsers. A recent push for the addition of WireGuard VPN to Linux kernel has triggered
its increasing adoption. However, despite the use of encryption, the need to monitor the traffic has not
decreased. The challenge that we are facing is monitoring analysis of encrypted traffic.
Fortunately, machine learning algorithms are increasingly available as well; therefore, statistical anal-
ysis of encrypted data can be performed with relative ease. There is a large body of research on encrypted
traffic classification and malware detection in encrypted traffic. The most recent results from Cisco show
that information from TLS protocol together with per packet metrics can be used to achieve high accu-
racy in malware detection. However, flow records need to be extended with additional information to
provide enough features for the machine learning algorithms.
1.3 The Future
The level of encryption can be only expected to grow. There is an RFC draft called Encrypted Server
Name Indication for TLS 1.3 which proposes to encrypt even Server Name Indication in TLS protocol.
Combined with increasing deployment of DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS protocols, most of the
current visibility into network traffic will soon be lost. This will result in higher demand for statistical
analysis of network traffic.
To obtain accurate results for encrypted traffic classification, an annotated dataset of high quality is
needed. There are two approaches to obtain such datasets. The first is to observe and capture normal
network traffic and manually or semi-automatically annotate it. The second approach is to generate
the traffic manually and label the observed traffic based on the known traffic patterns. However, both
approaches are time-consuming and error-prone. Moreover, such datasets become obsolete in time and
might not contain the necessary traffic mix that is seen in real networks. Therefore, most of the research
should be focused on generating and obtaining datasets that will enable us to perform encrypted traffic
classification with high accuracy.
A promising way to obtain such datasets is to combine information from multiple sources, such as
DNS resolvers, server logs, and application logs. This will allow us to assign labels to flow data with
high accuracy and create datasets that are both real and of high quality. Once the data sets are available,
machine learning can be used to find correlations and relations in the data, which can be used to analyse
even non-labelled traffic. However, masquerading network traffic as a different category is just the next
step that attackers are likely to be examining.
Apart from the encrypted traffic classification, there is also the question of the quality of the generated
data. For example, will the machine learning methods work well if flow generation parameters, such as
timeouts, are changed? How are the flow exporters behaving under heavy load, are the exported flows
incomplete? These and similar questions need to be answered, especially when machine learning is
relied upon.
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